Historieseminarium: Robert Roreitner (Charles University, Prague)
Aristotle on Perception of High-Level Properties
Aristotle is in various (zoological, ethical, and epistemological) contexts willing to speak of perceiving high-level items – such as kinds, individuals or messages. But it is not clear which – if any – theory or perception underlies these claims. The obvious candidate for providing at least a framework for such a theory is the notion of what can be perceived “incidentally”, introduced in De Anima as a complement to what can be perceived in its own right (i.e. low-level items). But existing interpretations of incidental perception yield widely diverging results: on some, Aristotle turns out to side with philosophers who allow for perception representing high-level items as such; on others, Aristotle ends up favoring the approach on which no difference between the expert and the laic is to be sought on the level of perception itself. In this paper, I propose a novel interpretation of incidental perception as, roughly, attempted discrimination of the perceived object from the relevant high-level alternatives, determined by the practical context. I argue that Aristotle’s theory allows for analyzing how something like expert perception can differ from something like laic perception without assuming that perception itself can represent high-level items as such. In the final part, the paper explores material from Parva Naturalia, arguing that it allows us to reconstruct at least in broad strokes the mechanism behind high-level perception.
The zoom link is https://stockholmuniversity.zoom.us/j/64922786699
Senast uppdaterad: 2026-09-17
Sidansvarig: Filosofiska institutionen