Högre seminarium i teoretisk filosofi: Sama Agahi
Can logical ladders be kicked?
The imagery of kicking a ladder after you have climbed it is familiar. Can logical ladders be kicked? This talk investigates whether there is any room for logical ladder-kicking in the context of self-sufficiency.
Self-sufficiency, as I understand it, concerns whether a logic can do its own metatheory — and whether it must be able to. The first is a technical question about what logical resources are required for various metatheoretical tasks; the second is a question in the philosophy of logic about the correctness criteria of logics. I say that a logic L is self-sufficient with respect to a metatheoretic property φ just in case establishing that L has φ requires no logical resources beyond those provided by L.
Logics can fail this condition. A proponent of a logic L that is not self-sufficient for some φ has several options: deny that self-sufficiency is required for φ; appeal to a recapture result justifying, in the relevant context, the use of resources beyond those L validates; or offer a "logical ladder" — establish that L has φ using resources L does not validate, and then kick the ladder away. Tennant has proposed this ladder strategy as a response to self-sufficiency failure.
This talk focuses on the ladder strategy. I argue it faces a structural difficulty: the belief that L has φ, reached via reasoning the believer comes to regard as invalid, is itself undermined by the very move that was supposed to secure it. I contrast this with recapture, which exploits contexts of coincidence rather than resources to be retrospectively abandoned, and thereby avoids the ladder's dialectical instability.
Senast uppdaterad: 2026-04-16
Sidansvarig: Department of Philosophy