Sofia De Caprariis Graduate Student
Contact
Name and title: Sofia De CaprariisGraduate Student
Workplace: Institute for International Economic Studies Länk till annan webbplats.
Visiting address Room A836Universitetsvägen 10 A, plan 8
Postal address Institutet för internationell ekonomi106 91 Stockholm
About me
I am a graduate student at the IIES and a candidate on the 2026/2027 Job Market.
My research interests lie in Economic Theory, Political Economy and Environmental Economics. With my research I aim to understand how political incentives shape major economic policy decisions, identify the mechanisms through which political considerations generate distortions and understand how changes in incentives and institutions affect equilibrium policy choices.
My Job Market Paper, "Political Horizons and Natural Resource Extraction", analyzes how democratic institutions shape politicians’ incentives over the intertemporal use of natural resources. It focuses on how term limits alter the trade-off between current political incentives and the future costs politicians face once they leave office.
Education
- PhD in Economics, IIES, Stockholm University (2027 - expected)
- Master’s Degree in Economics and Finance (cum laude with special mention of academic distinction), LUISS Guido Carli, Rome
- Bachelor’s Degree in Economics and Business (cum laude), LUISS Guido Carli, Rome
Fields of Research
Political Economy, Environmental Economics, and Economic Theory.
References
Per Krusell: per.krusell@iies.su.se
Bård Harstad: harstad@stanford.edu
John Hassler: john.hassler@iies.su.se
Mitch Downey: mitch.downey@iies.su.se
Job Market Paper
Political Horizons and Natural Resource Extraction
This paper develops a dynamic model of natural-resource extraction to examine how extraction choices and adoption of conservation legislation are shaped by political horizons. When politicians cannot constrain their successors, shorter political horizons exacerbate resource depletion, by reducing the benefits of preserving resources for future use in office and strengthening incentives to strategically deplete the stock available to subsequent governments, and electoral accountability can mitigate this only while incumbents remain eligible for re-election. When legislative constraints on over-extraction are feasible, however, shorter political horizons strengthen incentives to adopt such restrictions, even when they also constrain incumbents' own extraction choices. Cross-country evidence documents a positive empirical association between term limits and the adoption of forestry legislation.
Publications
The effects of COVID-19 lockdown on fairness and cooperation: Evidence from a lablike experiment
(with Irene Maria Buso, Daniela Di Cagno, Lorenzo Ferrari, Vittorio Larocca, Francesca Marazzi, Luca Panaccione, and Lorenzo Spadoni), Economics Letters, Volume 196, 2020.
Working Papers
Bank Bail-Outs, Domestic Sovereign Debt and Electoral Concerns
Bank bailouts are often considered necessary to preserve financial stability, yet they remain deeply unpopular among voters, creating a potential conflict between welfare maximization and governments’ electoral incentives. This paper investigates how rational voter opposition to bank bailouts affects government decisions regarding financial intervention, sovereign debt rollover, and additional debt issuance. To address these questions, I develop a two-period game-theoretical model featuring a banking sector exposed to sovereign default risk and an incumbent government facing re-election between periods. The model incorporates the sovereign-bank doom loop, whereby banking-sector distress and sovereign default risk reinforce one another. The analysis shows that the welfare-maximizing policy - rescuing troubled banks and issuing additional sovereign debt only when necessary to avoid default - is always implemented despite its negative impact on electoral outcomes. These findings suggest that voter opposition to bank bailouts does not necessarily translate into inefficient government intervention, highlighting the role of financial stability considerations in constraining politically motivated policy choices.
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