Martina Dosser Graduate Student

I am a PhD candidate in Economics at the IIES, Stockholm University. My research interests are in macroeconomics, with a focus on inequality and monetary policy.

I hold an MSc in Economics from the Stockholm School of Economics and an MA in Quantitative Economics and Finance from the University of St. Gallen.

I am on the 2026/27 academic job market.

Education

• PhD in Economics, 2027 (Expected) - IIES, Stockholm University (SE)
• MA in Quantitative Economics and Finance (2021) - University of St. Gallen (CH)
• MSc in Economics (2021) - Stockholm School of Economics (SE)
• Laurea in Economics and Social Sciences (2017) - Free University of Bolzano (IT)

Fields of Research

Macroeconomics

References

Per Krusell (advisor): per.krusell@iies.su.se
Kurt Mitman (advisor): kurt.mitman@iies.su.se
Joshua Weiss: joshua.weiss@iies.su.se
Kieran Larkin: kieran.larkin@iies.su.se

Job Market Paper

Who Prices Deposits? A Heterogeneous-Agent Model with Deposit Rate Determination

Working Papers

Downward Wage Rigidity and the Intensive and Extensive Margin of Labor Adjustments

Enhanced access to administrative data has provided new insights into wage and earnings changes and labor input adjustments. In particular, there is mounting evidence supporting the notion of wages being downwardly rigid and pointing towards an allocative effect of wages on both working hours and employment. This paper rationalizes these empirical findings within a parsimonious search and matching model with labor input adjustments along the intensive and extensive margin. Firms and workers bargain over both wages and hours, subject to a lower bound on wages determined by the match’s wage history. The wage constraint distorts hours choices and can induce separations that would be avoided under flexible wages. Forward-looking bargaining compresses wage increases, as firms and workers internalize that higher wages today restrict their ability to adjust wages in the future. The model also generates an asymmetric decomposition of earnings changes, with hours adjustments accounting for a larger share of earnings reductions than increases.

Household Wealth, Bank Entry, and Optimal Taxation

This paper studies the implications of wealth-dependent deposit demand for the efficiency of bank entry and optimal taxation. Banks exercise market power by offering deposit rates below the policy rate, discouraging saving and leaving too few resources allocated to the banking sector. In contrast to the CES benchmark, within-sector allocation is also inefficient: banks are too large and entry is too low. Correcting the saving distortion alone generally fails to restore efficiency. In a representative agent economy, the optimal policy combines a tax on current consumption with a subsidy to banks’ operating profits, encouraging saving while strengthening entry incentives. Evaluating different tax instruments, I illustrate how the second-best policy depends on the economy’s wealth, with wealthier economies favoring a consumption tax and poorer economies a bank profit tax. Household heterogeneity adds a distributional dimension: deposit-rich households’ rate sensitivity drives banks’ pricing and entry incentives, while additional banking variety benefits all households.