From Turkey's Democrat Party to today's NATO: Interview with Reuben Silverman

The Rise and Fall of Turkey's Democrat Party: The Cold War and Illiberalism, 1945–60 argues against interpreting the Democrat in terms of strict binaries. Instead, it presents an account of the Democrat Party, its role in Turkey’s democratization, and its engagement with the emerging Cold War order that is mindful of the divides in Turkey but that also acknowledges the party’s ability to transcend those divides – or, at least, embody their multiple contradictions.

We were able to ask Reuben a few questions before his anticipated book launch event, tentatively scheduled for early this year.

What is the book about and what drew you to the subject?

Turkey’s Democrat Party was the country’s first party to be elected in relatively free elections and also its first party to be removed by a military coup. Moreover, the ten years during which it governed—the 1950s—was the decade during which Turkey became deeply integrated into the economic and security institutions of the American-led Cold War order. The Democrats’ centrality to these experiences of democratization and alliance with an American-dominated capitalist order have made its legacy highly contested. Turkey’s current leaders emphasize their political descent from the Democrats and embrace its populist, majoritarian aspects. Critics of the government would point to the Democrat’s authoritarian policies as the more essential similarity. Rather than discern some core truth about the party and “prove” either side of such debates, my aim in the book is to give an account of Democrat Party that shows both its connection to a longer history of politics in Turkey and the way the party itself changed in response to the new challenges and opportunities it faced.

How is it relevant for understanding Turkey in NATO today?

Turkey joined NATO in large part due to decisions made by the Democrat Party leadership. Within months of entering office, the government agreed to send Turkish soldiers to fight on the Korean peninsula. This willingness to actively support American policies gained the government goodwill as Democrat leaders pushed for inclusion in NATO. But the efforts they had to make to gain acceptance left them with few illusions about the transactional nature of NATO. For Turkey, NATO membership was a multi-year process that included several rejections. And while the Democrat’s predecessors had gained American support by talking of shared values and opening up Turkey’s political system to multiparty politics, it was the Democrat’s more dramatic action that led to acceptance into NATO.

Having proved their willingness to commit Turkish soldiers to fight and die in Korea, Democrat leaders spent the remainder of the 1950s driving hard bargains with their peers in the United States and Europe. While they were not always successful, Democrats were consistent and insistent in their maximalist demands for financial aid and sympathetic consideration. One important contribution of this book is its inclusion of archival documents from the US and UK that show Turkey’s leaders’ skillful efforts at playing their allies (who doubled as their creditors) off against one another, securing new loans and delays in outstanding older ones. Even when these maneuvers came up short, the centrality of Turkey to American interests helped soften the pain of currency devaluation and budget cuts. But commitment to NATO was not just a card that the Democrats could play. When the party was removed from power, the military leaders who ousted it were quick to declare that they too would be reliable supporters of NATO. Given Turkey’s experience, it should not be surprising that its leaders continue to see the security alliance a venue for negotiating and pursuing national interest and domestic political advantage.

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